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STATE TAXATION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS ENGAGED
SOLELY IN INTERSTATE OR FOREIGN COMMERCE
THROUGHOUT our fiscal systems flourish unhealthy tax exemptions created in
the name of a constitution that forbids discrimination.1 A flagrant instance
is the comparative immunity from state taxation often enjoyed by foreign
corporations skillful enough to confine their activities to interstate or
foreign commerce. 2 Such a corporation may have a regular place of
1. See, for example, Van Alstine, Federal Subsidies through Tax Exemption,
NAT. TAX Ass'N PROCEEDINGS (1921) 459; Hardy, Taxation and Tax Exempt
Securities, id. (1925) 222.
2. The immunity seems to have been first established in Gloucester Ferry
Company v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196 (1885). The tax involved vas a
franchise tax on capital stock. The Court suggested that the state might levy
a tax on the corporation property within the state-a lease of certain wharves.
Cf. Norfolk and Western Rr. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 136 U. S. if4 (1890).
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business within the state, draw substantial profits from its citizens, enjoy
in innumerable ways the protection of its government, and yet escape
entirely the business taxes of the state. Several times within the last
decade the problem has been squarely presented to the Supreme Court.
Each time, with minor variations in reasoning to cover slightly variant
facts, the Court has deftly flung the protective mantle of the commerce
clause about the shoulders of the protestant.
The first of these beneficiaries was the Ozark Pipe Line Corporation,
a Maryland corporation which was engaged in transporting oil from
Oklahoma to Illinois but which had established its principal office in
Missouri. 3 In that state it hired its employees, purchased its supplies, held
its meetings, and even operated a fleet of trucks. From the state of
Missouri it had obtained a license to engage "exclusively in the business
of transporting crude petroleum by pipe line," which carried with it
the power of eminent domain. In return, the state requested an annual
franchise tax equal to one tenth of one per cent of the capital and surplus
employed within its boundaries. 4 The corporation carried its shocked
surprise to a sympathetic court. Mr. Justice Sutherland declared that
the corporation's many activities within the state were merely the "means
and instrumentalities" by which an interstate business was done. The
formula that a state may not impose a privilege tax upon a foreign cor-
poration doing only interstate business therefore disposed of the case.
5
The corporation's license to engage in the transportation of petroleum
certainly was not expressly limited to interstate transportation; nor was
the power of eminent domain available to it except as a domesticated
corporation. 6 Yet these privileges, for which the state thought itself
entitled to compensation, were branded as immaterial by the Court.
The Alpha Portland Cement Company case 7 would have been an even
easier victim of the same formula had it not been for the splendid fight
put up by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. The company,
although it had a district sales office and many customers in Massachu-
setts, was clearly engaged in only interstate commerce; it had no need
of any Massachusetts license. But the contested tax did not depend upon
a license. It was denominated an "excise with respect to the carrying on
and doing of business within the Commonwealth," and was measured by
the portion of corporate excess employed within the state and by the net
income derived from business therein. It was defended by the Supreme
3. Ozark Pipe Line Corporation v. Monier, 266 U. S. 555 (1925).
4. The corporation did pay, without protest, a property tax on its right
of way and an original license fee.
5. The dissent of Mr. Justice Brandeis exposed the real issue when he said:
"I find in the Commerce Clause no warrant for thus putting a State to the
choice of abandoning the corporate franchise tax or discriminating against
intrastate commerce." 266 U. S. 570. Cf. State Tax Comnlission v. Interstate
Natural Gas Company, 284 U. S. 41 (1931).
6. See Southern Illinois & Missouri Bridge Company v. Stone, 174 Mo. 1,
31, 73 S. W. 453, 460 (1903).
7. Alpha Portland Cement Company v. Massachusetts, 268 U. S. 203 (1925).
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Judicial Court, not as a privilege tax, but as a combination property and
net income tax.8  Mr. Justice McReynolds refused, however, to consider
its validity as either. The tax was accepted for exactly what it called
itself, "an excise on account of doing business." The corporate excess and
net income factors were dismissed from consideration because they were
only the measures of the tax; the determinative characteristic was the
formal subject, the doing of business, in this case interstate business,0
Despite the denials of the Massachusetts court, the tax was treated as
an attempt to burden a privilege beyond the power of the state to give or
to withhold.
The Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corporation 10 was, in most respects, as
cautious as its illustrious predecessors. It imported fertilizer at the port
of Mobile, stored it in the original packages at a public warehouse, sold it
through commissioned salesmen, delivered it, still in the original packages,
through an independent contractor, and received payment in cash trans-
mitted immediately to the home office in New York. But these fastidious
arrangements were curiously accompanied by an apparent inconsistency;
the corporation qualified to do local business.1 For this privilege
Alabama demanded an annual franchise tax of two dollars for every
thousand dollars of capital employed within the state. The assessment
8. See Alpha Portland Cement Company v. Commonwealth, 244 Mass. 530,
548, 550, 139 N. E. 158, 161, 162 (1923). Corporate excess is defined by the
statute as the fair cash value of the shares constituting capital stock employed
within the Commonwealth less real and personal pioperty subject to local taxation
and less certain tax exembt securities. The Massachusetts court said this
element of the tax was upon property used within the state. It distinguished
as a license, rather than property or income tax, the tax which failed in Cheney
Brothers Company v. Massachusetts, 246 U. S. 147 (1918). Chief Justice
Rugg was, however, somewhat ill-advised in saying of the new tax, "It is an
excise for the privilege of having a place of business under the protection of
our laws." 244 Mass. 547.
9. Commenting upon this aspect of the case, Professor Powell asks, "If an
Intrinsically bad measure can vitiate a tax on a traditionally proper subject,
why in the name of common sense can't an intrinsically good measure validate
a tax on a traditionally improper subject?" See Business Taxes and Mke Ped-
-eral Constitution, NAT. TAX ASS'N Pr0CEEDINGS (1925) 164, 171..
10. Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corporation v. State of Alabama, 53 Sup.
Ct. 373 (U. S. 1933), noted in (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 963.
11. Even this apparent blunder may have been the part of studied caution.
The authors of the scheme may have foreseen dangers which never developed.
The courts might have held that the fertilizer was shipped in such unusually
small packages (100 lb. bags) that it was not within the protection of the
original package doctrine. Cf. Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U. S, 343 (1900).
Such a holding might have caused embarrassments under the Alabama statute
.providing "No corporation, its agents, officers or servants shall transact any
business for or in the name of such corporation within the State of Alabama
without having first procured said permit, and all contracts, engagements or
undertakings, or agreements with, by, or to such corporation made without
obtaining said permit, shall be null and void." ALA. GErN. ACTS (1927) No.
163, § 42, p. 172.
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was based upon the fertilizer stored in the public warehouse on tax day.
The corporation of course objected that it was a tax on imports and a
burden upon foreign commerce.
The Alabama court thought that the answer to these objections could
be found in the distinction between the subject and measure of taxation.12
It reasoned that the subject, the license to do business locally, was clearly
unobjectionable, and that the imports, even if themselves tax free, could
be used as the measure of the tax since they were not directly affected
thereby. It appealed particularly to the clear elaboration of this dis-
tinction in cases concerning the taxation of federal instrumentalities.23
If a corporate franchise may be measured by the income from tax-exempt
securities, why not also by tax-exempt imports? But for the purposes of
reversal last February, Mr. Justice Butler did not find it necessary ex-
plicitly to discredit the distinction between subject and measure, nor
even to deny that the law of federal instrumentalities is determinative of
the law of interstate commerce. Instead, he convicted the state of Alabama
out of the mouth of its own supreme court. In a somewhat different
connection that court had declared that the tax was not on the bare
privilege to do local business but rather on its actual exercise of the
privilege in the doing of business.' 4 The only business which the Anglo-
12. State v. Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corporation, 142 So. 87 (Ala.
1932). The state court also relied heavily upon New York State v. Roberts,
171 U. S. 658 (1898). In that case the corporation did some local business.
The Court did however expressly hold, Mr. Justice Butler's denial in the
Anglo-Chilean case notwithstanding (53 Sup. Ct. at 376), that a tax on the
privilege of doing local business could be measured by tax-free imports. But
that was before Western Union Telegraph Company v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1
(1910), had played havoc with the rules of subject and measure in the taxation
of interstate commerce. If the Anglo-Chilean Corporation were to do some
local business, an engaging question would be presented. The Court could
then hardly hold the imports taxable without considerable re-interpretation of
the present opinion; yet it could hardly do otherwise without over-ruling the
Roberts case and without weaving some fine distinctions about Western
Cartridge Company v. Emmerson, 281 U. S. 511 (1930), and Hump Hairpin
Manufacturing Company v. Emmerson, 258 U. S. 290 (1922). In the latter
cases, interstate sales were frankly allowed in the allocation fraction of capital
stock taxes. The Court might explain that the allocation fraction is one step
further removed from the subject of the tax than is the usual measure; that
it is only a determinant of the measure.
13. Mr. Justice Cardozo, in a dissent concurred in by Mr. Justice Brandeis
and Mr. Justice Stone, also relied quite indiscriminately on government in-
strumentality and interstate commerce cases.
The confidence of the state court in the correctness of its decision must have
been considerably enhanced by the decision last spring in Pacific Company v.
Johnson, 285 U. S. 480 (1932), practically overruling Mlacallen Company v.
Massachusetts, 279 U. S. 620 (1929).
14. See State v. National Cash Credit Association, 224 Ala. 629, 141 So.
541 (1932). A foreign holding company was held not subject to the tax
although it had had to qualify in order to own stock in an Alabama corporation.
The main reason was that the capital employed was the same as the subsi-
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Chilean Corporation had transacted was the importation of nitrate. Thus
subject and measure merged, the immunity of one infected also the other,
and the corporation, despite its own error, went scot-free.1 5
Perhaps the case itself is too much of a freak to be very significant, The
Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corporation will not, hereafter, qualify for a
local business which it does not intend to do; the Alabama court will be
extremely chary of descriptive words about Alabama taxes. But running
through all three cases, with increasing clarity, appears one abiding moral;
the foreign corporation which makes an earnest effort to stay within the
confines of interstate or foreign commerce may feel assured that the in-
genuity of the Supreme Court will not be wanting in its behalf. The
same assurance may not be quite so comforting to progressive tax officials,
They know that foreign and domestic corporations which do interstate
and intrastate business pay taxes on both.'0 They also know, ,thanks to
the decision last fall in Detroit International Bridge Company v. Cor-
poration Tax Appeal Board of Michigan,'7 that the Court is not likely to
be as fertile with legal idioms for the protection of domestic corporations
diary's capital which was already taxed. The state court would have been
truer to its own distinction between subject and measure if it had said that
there was no tax, not because there was no exercise of the franchise, but
because there was no new capital employed. Such a holding would have paved
the way for the argument that there was only one subject, the franchise, and
one measure, the business done, i.e. the capital employed, within the state,
instead of two subjects, the franchise and the business; that there was no
tax when there was no business done in the state simply because the measure
registered zero. Probably this would not have defeated Mr. Justice Butler,
but it might have made his going harder.
15. The decision is not easy to square with Ficklen v. Shelby County
Taxing District, 145 U. S. 1 (1892), in which brokers who had received a
license to do a general brokerage business were held liable to a tax measured
by their gross commissions even though they had negotiated only interstate
transactions. The Ficklen case was distinguished and somewhat discredited
in Crew Levick Company v. Pennsylvania, 245 U. S. 202 (1917), and was not
even cited by Mr. Justice Cardozo in his dissent in the Nitrate case.
16. Although theoretically this is not supposed to be true, it can hardly be
doubted since the decisions in Hump Hairpin Manufacturing Company v.
Emmerson and Western Cartridge Company v. Emmerson, supra note 12, Under-
wood Typewriter Company v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113 (1920), and St.
Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Middlekamp, 256 U. S. 226 (1921).
17. 53 Sup. Ct. 137 (U. S. 1933). The Court explained that the tax was
not on the exercise of the franchise, but on the privilege itself, just the opposite
of the Alabama tax. This is true, in the sense that Michigan taxed domestic
corporations even though they did all their business outside the state. Bu
under the rule of the Western Union case, supra note 12, a state could not
levy such a tax on foreign corporations doing any interstate business unless
it were only a flat fee; if it were measured by capital stock or income it would
probably be held a tax on business or property outside the state. Therefore
it is unlikely that the Alabama statute could be amended to meet Mr. Justice
Butler's objections. Cf. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Stratton, 57 F.
(2d) 211 (S. D. Ill., 1931), rev'd on jurisdictional grounds, 284 U, S. 530 (1932).
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engaged solely in interstate commerce.18  And they may quite properly
feel that these are discriminatory situations which must not be permitted
to endure.' 9
Of course the Supreme Court has not yet conclusively demonstrated that
no satisfactory tax can be devised which will fall equally upon all foreign
and domestic corporations. There still remains the possibility-apparently
left open in the Aplh Portland Cement Company case-that exactions
really worthy of the name property or net income taxes, might turn the
trick. Undoubtedly property within the state belonging to a foreign
corporation doing only interstate business can be subjected to the ordinary
property tax.2 0 The question is, can a capital stock tax be called a property
tax and used to reach intangible values apportioned to the state, not only
according to the amount of tangible property, which might be quite small,
but also according to the volume of business transacted. Judged by logical
deduction from the language of cases sustaining ad valorem taxation of
corporations doing some local business, the chances would seem excellent,% '
but the more recent attitude of the Court shakes one's confidence.= An-
other possible outlet is the gross earnings tax "in lieu of property taxes,"
which might be inviting were it not for broad intimations scattered
through the cases that such a tax may be upset upon a showing that it
imposes a heavier burden than the ordinary property levies of the state.2
At any rate, it would be unfortunate if corporation taxes were crowded
18. Compare Schwab v. Richardson, 263 U. S. 88 (1923), with Ozark Pipe
Line Corporation v. Monier, supra note 3.
19. An enlightening glimpse of the practical effects of these decisions is
given in the REPORT or THE COAiuAISSIONER OF CORPORATIONs AND TAxATioN OF
MssAcHUSmTS (1925) 49, only a few months after the decision in the Alpha
Portland Cement ease. Refunds of $379,541.11 had been necessitated and 202
corporations had been withdrawn from the tax lists.
20. See Powell, Indirect Encroachment on Federal Authority by the Taxing
Powers of the States, VII (1919) 32 HARv. L. REv. 634, 636 n. 11.
21. See State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575 (1876); Adams Express
Company v. Ohio, 165 U. S. 194 (1897), rehearing denied with long opinion,
166 U. S. 185 (1897); Pullman Palace Car Company v. Pennsylvania, 141
U. S. at 218.
22. In the Alpha Portland Cement case Mr. Justice McReynolds said
ominously: "Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U. S. 275, 282 et scq. pointed
out the limitations which must be observed when property used in interstate
commerce is valued for purposes of taxation by a state. We there declined
to follow the rule applied in Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania and held
that determination of real value with fair accuracy was essential." 263
U. S. at 218.
23. See Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry., 142 U. S. 217 (1891); particularly
as interpreted in Galveston, Harrisburg and San Antonio Ry. Co. v. Texas,
210 U. S. 217 (1908); United States Express Company v. Minnesota, 223 U. S.
335, 348 (1912); Pullman Company v. Richardson, 261 U. S. 330, 339 (1923);
Great Northern Ry. v. Minnesota, 278 U. S. 503, 504 (1929); cf. Oklahoma v.
Wells Fargo & Co., 223 U. S. 298 (1912); New Jersey Bell Telephone Company
v. Tax Board, 280 U. S. 338 (1930).
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back, by judicial decision, in the direction of the property mold from
which they have so laboriously evolved.2 4
The income tax, on the other hand, is the toast of the reformers, and
in the commerce cases it has also been the favorite of the Supreme Court.
True, it has been tested only by domestic corporations doing some local
business, but it has been sustained on the ground that net income was too
far removed from commerce to deserve immunity. 25 Furthermore, in
upholding a net income tax on the business of a non-resident individual
the Court in one case was willing to assume, for purposes of argument,
that the business was interstate.26 Unless the Court undertakes to dis-
tinguish this case by denying the assumption it made, it is difficult to
see how it can gainsay the validity of an income tax imposed also upon
a foreign corporation doing an interstate business. But it is also true
that even the most ardent advocates of the net income tax concede the
desirability of coupling with it some more stable measure such as Massa-
chusetts in fact attempted in the tax which the Court struck down.
2 7
Finally, it is here pertinent to recall that net income taxes unlike franchise
taxes, may not include in their measure the income from tax exempt securi-
ties. Thus the divergence in the law of subject and measure respecting
government instrumentalities and that respecting interstate commerce be-
comes more than a legal curiosity. A franchise tax will reach tax exempt
securities but fails to reach corporations engaged solely in interstate busi-
ness; a net income tax will do just the opposite. And a state wishing, or
by its own constitution required, to tax all corporations alike must suffer
one exemption or the other to fester in its taxing system.
So capricious a result does much to illumine the unhappiness caused state
tax administrators by Supreme Court decisions on the taxation of interstate
business. 28 Their distress has already culminated in the introduction in
both houses of Congress of bills permitting non-discriminatory state tax-
ation of interstate commerce. 29 Perhaps that is not an adequate remedy;
24. See SELIGMAN, ESSAYS IN TAXATION (10th ed. 1925) 142; Ravage,
Valuation of Public Utilities for Ad Valorem Taxation (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 487.
25. United States Glue Company v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321 (1918);
Peck & Company v. Lowe, 247 U. S. 165 (1918); Powell, op. cit. supra note
20 and op. cit. supra note 9. Wisconsin has applied its tax to domestic cor-
porations doing only interstate business. Superior v. Allouez Bay Dock Co.,
166 Wis. 76, 164 N. W. 362 (1917).
26. Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37, 57 (1920).
27. See SELIGMAN, op. cit. supra note 24, at 249.
28. See Long, Present Status of the State Income Tax as a Business Tax,
NAT. TAx Ass'N PROCEEDINGS (1925) 151, 158; Haig, The, Coordination of State
and Federal Tax Systems (1932) 18 BULL. NAT. TAX Ass'N 66, 69.
29. The bills provide, "That each of the several states may levy and collect
license, franchise, gross revenue, registration, or any other forms of taxes,
upon or measured by, any property employed, or business done, within such
state, in interstate commerce, in the same manner and to the same extent as
such taxes may be imposed under the constitution and laws of such state upon
like property employed, and business done, in commerce wholly within the
[Vol. 4zYALE LAW JOURNAL1102
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possibly the dangers of double taxation and the desirability of securing a
measure of uniformity require federal taxation of interstate business as
the ultimate solution.30 The answer must be sought through consideration
of the problem in its full setting of the relations between state and federal
revenues.3 1  The rule that Marshall fathered must be revised with the
statesmanship of a Marshall informed by the needs of today.
N. L. N.
COMPULSORY MOTOR CARRIER RiSURANCE
THE growth of heavy motor carrier traffic, causing an increasing number
of accidents,' has led legislatures in forty-five states to adopt statutes
requiring, as a condition to the issue of a certificate of operation, that
every public motor carrier file with a commission a bond or a liability
and indemnity policy guaranteeing payment of any final judgment for
injury or damage caused by the carrier.2  These statutes have been held
state, except that (a) in no case shall the tax imposed be at a greater rate
than is assessed upon like property employed, and business done, in commerce
-wholly within the state, and (b) nothing contained in this Act shall be con-
strued to authorize the taxation of the same property and business by more
than one state." 72d Cong., 1st Sess., S. 3074, H. R. 9692. See King, Taxation
of Capital Employed in Interstate Commcrce (1933) 11 TAx MAO. 56.
30. See Comment (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 1273.
31. See Journal of the First Interstate Legislative Assembly, Feb. 3 and 4,
1933, Washington, D. C.
1. For a survey of automobile accidents and a proposed compulsory in-
surance law see Compensation for Automobile Accidents: A Symposium (1932)
32 COL. L. REV. 785, and Report by the Committee to Study Compensation for
Automobile Accidents (1932), cited and discussed therein.
2. ALA. CODE (Michie, 1928) § 6270(5); Anm. CODE (Strucklmeyer, 1928)
§ 740; ARK. DIG. STAT. (Castles, Supp. 1931) § 7440c (e); COLO. CoMP. L WS
(Courtright, Supp. 1932) § 3000.17; CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 1568; FLA.
lComp. LAWS (Supp. 1932) § 1335(6); GA. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1930)
§ 1770 (60 ii); IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) § 59-806; ILL. REv. STAT. (Smith-
Hurd, 1931) c. 121, § 244; IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926) § 10160; IowA CODE
(1931) § 5105a26; KA . REv. STAT. (Crane, Supp. 1931) c. 6M-1,102; Ky.
STAT. (Carroll, 1930) § 2739j-38a; LA. REv. STAT. ANN. (Marr, Supp. 1926)
p. 70; Am REv. STAT. (1930) p. 1100 § 7; MD. LAWS 1931 c. 485, p. 1210; MAss.
GEN. LAws (1932) c. 175 §§ 112, 113, 113A; MICH. Co.iP. LAWs (1929) § 11348;
MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 5015-11; Miss. CODE ANN. (1930) § 7124; Mo.
REv. STAT. (1929) § 5274; MONT. REv. CODE (Choate, Supp. 1927) § 3858.6;
NEB. Con,. STAT. (1929) § 60-104; NEV. CoMPi. LAws (Hillyer, 1929) § 6117;
N. H. Pun. LAWS (1926) p. 1008 § 6; N. J. COMP. STAT. (Supp. 1925-1930)
§ 136-4,000 A (2); N. M. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1929) § 11-1005; N. Y.
VEHICLE AND TRAFFIc LAw (McKinney, 1929) c. 62-A § 17; N. C. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1931) § 2613 (o); X. D. ComP. LAws ANN. (Supp. 1925) § 2976 v.
9; OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, Supp. 1931) § 614-99; OLA. STAT. (Harlow, 1931)
§§ 3697, 3708; OMn CODE ANN. (1930) v. 3 § 55-1317; R. I. GEN. LAWS (1923)
§ 3734; S. C. Crv. CODE (1932) v. 3 § 8511; S. D. Corap. LAWS (1929) §§
valid insofar as they make reasonable distinctions between jitneys, taxi-
cabs, and long haul busses, and impose burdens commensurate with the
need for protection of the public.3 Separate provisions, however, requiring
a bond in an excessive amount,4 excluding private sureties,
0 accepting
only unincumbered land as security, 6 or creating a lien on such land in
favor of the injured party,7 have been held unconstitutional by various
state courts as either unreasonable or discriminatory. City ordinances
making motor carrier insurance compulsory
s are subject to the same
constitutional requirements as statutes, 'in addition to the limitations of
the authority conferred on the city by its charter D or by statute.
10  Two
ordinances specifying that the insurer's liability continue in the amount
stated even after a recovery under the bond, have been held uncon-
stitutional because of the alleged difficulty and expense of acquiring such
a bond. 1 However, a similar provision in a statute was held constitutional
because such bonds were already being issued and the increase in cost
to the assured was considered not confiscatory.
12 Courts have also upheld
legislation authorizing a commission to make such regulations for carriers
as are reasonably necessary for the public safety,'
3 and to determine
whether a given carrier falls within the statutory definition of the class
for which a bond or policy is required.
14 But they have refused to allow
9744-0, 9744-P; TENN. CODE (Shannon, 1932) § 5483; CoMPLErn TEx. STAT.
(Vernon, 1928) art. 911a § 11; UTAH LAWS (1925) c. 114; VT. LAws (1925)
(No. 73) p. 113; VA. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1930) § 4097r; WASH. COMP. STAT.
(Remington, 1932) §§ 6383, 6384; W. VA. CODE (1931) c. 17, art. 6 § 6; WIS.
STAT. (1931) § 194.14; Wyo. REv. STAT. ANN. (1931) § 72-527.
3. Packard v. Banton, 264 U. S. 140 (1924); Nolan v. Riechman, 225 Fed.
812 (W. D. Tenn. 1915); Peterson v. Beal, 121 Neb. 348, 237 N. W. 146 (1931).
4. People v. Kastings, 307 Ill. 92, 138 N. E. 269 (1923); see (1923) 22
A. L. R. 230, 234 for amounts held reasonable.
5. Jitney- Bus Association of Wilkes Barre v. City of Wilkes Barre, 256
Pa. 462, 100 Atl. 954 (1917). Contra: Ex parte Cardinal, 170 Cal. 519, 150
Pac. 348 (1915); State v. Seattle Taxicab and Transfer Co., 90 Wash. 416,
156 Pac. 837 (1916); cf. In re Opinion of the Justices 81 N. H. 566, 129 Atl.
117 (1925).
6. People v. Kastings, supra note 4.
7. Weksler v. Collins, 317 Ill. 132, 147 N. E. 797 (1925); Checker Taxi Co.
v. Collins, 320 Ill. 605, 151 N. E. 675 (1926).
8. No statute was found in California, Delaware, and Pennsylvania. Cases
involving ordinances in California and Pennsylvania are: Kruger v. Cali-
fornia Highway Indemnity Exchange, 201' Cal. 672, 258 Pac. 602 (1927);
Jitney Bus Association of Wilkes Barre v. City of Wilkes Barre, supra note 5.
9. State of Florida ex. rel. Stephenson v. Dillon, 82 Fla. 276, 89 So. 558
(1921).
10. Commonwealth v. Theberge, 231 Mass. 386, 121 N. E. 30 (1918).
11. State of Florida ex. rel. Stephenson v. Dillon, supra note 9; People v.
Kastings, supra note 4.
12. People v. Martin, 203 App. Div. 423, 197 N. Y. Supp. 28 (1st Dep't 1922).
13. Practically every statute makes the insurance policy subject to the
approval of the Commission.
14. Griffon v. Villia, 167 La. 683, 120 So. 50 (1929).
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a commission to exercise unlimited discretion as to the use of the streets
by carriers, 1 or to require on its own initiative their compulsory in-
surance.16
In attempting to comply with these requirements motor carriers usually
apply to established insurance companies and receive from them a policy
of the conventional type, evolved to protect the applicant to whom it is
issued and the insurance company. The policy is often altered through the
addition by the insurance company or by the commission of a rider stating
inter ali that the policy is issued to afford the public the measure of pro-
tection contemplated by the statute and is to include the statutory require-
ments whether omitted from the policy or contradicted therein. The
resulting document, embodying unrelated attempts to protect the assured
and the public, as well as to safeguard the interests of the insurer, is seldom
free from ambiguity and frequently includes contradictions arising from the,
incompatibility of a private insurance contract and an insurance contract
meant primarily for the benefit of the public. In its interpretation the
courts have experienced considerable difficulty.
Some statutes and policies permit an injured party to sue the insurer
of any automobile owner if a judgment previously rendered against the
assured has been left unsatisfied because of insolvency. In such cases,
failure of the assured to perform one of the conditions of the policy, for
example to give notice of the accident,' 7 or of the service of summons, 8
or to co-operate with the insurer,19 is, according to the majority rule, a
defense. The reason given is that the statutes and policies authorizing
such suits generally condition the rights of the injured party in his suit
against the insurer on the terms of the policy; the liability of the insurer
is still thought to depend entirely on its private contractual obligation to
the assured. But the purpose of the insolvency statutes is to give the
injured party *recourse against one who is financially responsible. And
this purpose is defeated if recovery is dependent upon the performance
by the assured of conditions in the policy; for the assured, if insolvent,
has no compelling interest in such performance. A liberal minority,
15. Dent v. Oregon City, 106 Ore. 122, 211 Pac. 909 (1923); Note (1931)
19 GEo. L. J. 484.
16. Patrick v. Smith, 60 App. D. C. 6, 45 F. (2d) 924 (1930); West v.
Sun Cab Co., 160 Md. 476, 154 Atl. 100 (1931).
17. By statute: Stacey v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York, 114
Ohio St. 633, 151 N. E. 718 (1926); Backhuber v. Boosales, 200 Wis. 574, 229
N. W. 117 (1930). By policy: Peeler v. United States Casualty Co., 197 N. C.
286, 148 S. E. 261 (1929).
18. By statute: Miller v. Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Co. of New York,
50 R. 1. 166, 146 Atl. 412 (1929). By policy: New Jersey Fidelity and Plate
Glass Insurance Co. v. Love, 43 F. (2d) 82 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930).
19. By statute: Schoenfeld v. New Jersey Fidelity and Plate Glass Insurance
Co., 203 App. Div. 796, 197 N. Y. Supp. 606 (2d Dep't 1922); Seltzer v. In-
demnity Insurance Co. of North America, 252 N. Y. 330, 169 N. E. 403 (1929);
Note (1930) 30 CoL. L. REv. 737. By policy: American Automobile Insurance
Co. v. Fidelity and Casualty Insurance Co. of New York, 159 Md. 631, 152
Atl. 523 (1930); see (1931) 72 A. L. R. 1446.
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recognizing the public nature of the obligation of the insurer and the
social desirability of distribution of losses, has held, therefore, that the
right of the injured party to sue the insurer evidences a separate obligation
which cannot be defeated by an act or omission of the assured.
2 0
However, when suit is brought by an injured party against the insurer
of a motor carrier under a statute making insurance compulsory, recovery
is usually allowed regardless of policy defenses of the insurer against the
assured.2 1 This is done largely because of the desire of the courts to
effectuate the express purpose of the statutes-protection of the public.
Various decisions illustrate the tendency of the courts to impose liability on
the insurer whenever possible. Change in ownership of the bus covered,2
2 in-
stallation of a new engine different from the one specified in the policy,
23
and temporary diversion of the car to the owner's private use,2 4 have all
been held insufficient to relieve the insurer of liability. Furthermore,
notice to the Secretary of State of cancellation of the carrier's bond has
been treated as not taking effect as of the time of its receipt, with the result
that liability has been imposed on the insurer for an accident occurring
shortly thereafter.25 Similarly, expiration of a carrier's license under
which a bond was issued was held not to terminate liability on the bond
even though one of its conditions was operation of the taxicab in accord-
ance with the laws of the state and the ordinances of the city.20 And even
20. By statute: Edwards v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York, 11
La. App. 176, 123 So. 162 (1929); Comment (1929) 9 Onr. L. REv. 57; Note
(1929) 39 YALE L. J. 131. By policy: Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Co. of
New York v. Albritton, 214 Ky. 16, 282 S. W. 187 (1926); Finkelborg v.
Continental Casualty Co., 126 Wash. 543, 219 Pac. 12 (1923), modified, Mer-
riman v. Maryland Casualty Co., 147 Wash. 579, 266 Pac. 682 (1928), to
allow the insurer to defend on the merits; Note (1931) 44 HARv. L. RE. 470.
21. Kruger v. California Highway Indemnity Exchange, supra note 8;
Curtis v. Michaelson, 206 Iowa 111, 219 N. W. 49 (1928); Gillard v. Manu-
facturers Insurance Co. of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 93 N. J. 215, 107 AtI.
446 (1919); Devlin v. New York Mutual Casualty Taxicab Insurance Co., 123
Misc. 784, 206 N. Y. Supp. 365 (Sup. Ct. 1924); Ott v. American Fidelity and
Casualty Co., 161 S. C. 314, 159 S. E. 635 (1931); American Fidelity and
Casualty Co. v. Williams, 34 S. W. (2d) 396 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
22. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Allen, 158 Tenn. 504, 14
S. W. (2d) 724 (1929).
23. Boyle v. Manufacturers Liability Insurance Co., 96 N. J. L. 380, 115
Atl. 383 (1921), aff'd, 97 N. J. L. 561, 117 Atl. 925 (1922).
24. Zelber v. Commonwealth Casualty Co., 106 N. J. L. 611, 150 Atl. 243
(1930) (statute required insurance for ownership and operation as an autobus) ;
cf. Weksler v. Collins, supra note 7; Interstate Casualty Co. of Birmingham v.
Martin, 234 S. W. 710 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
25. Dunn v. Bailey, 143 Wash. 570, 255 Pac. 930 (1927) (evidence pro-
sented that notice was received two hours before the accident).
26. Detroit v. Blue Ribbon Auto Drivers' Association, 254 Mich. 263, 237
N. W. 61 (1931). The general rule regarding other types of licenses is contra:
Spiegler v. City of Chicago, 216 Ill. 114, 74 N. E. 718 (1905); Commonwealth
v. Foch Cereal Co., 302 Pa. 373, 153 Atl. 695 (1931); see (1931) 74 A. L. R. 1309.
after the receipt of partial payment made by the assured on a judgment,
an injured party was allowed recovery against the surety to the full amount
of the bond, the total recovery not exceeding the amount of the judgment.
-
In most of the above cases the policy alone or both the policy and the
statute expressly provide that the defenses of the insurer against the
assured shall not prejudice the rights of the injured party. The insurer
may therefore be regarded as having voluntarily contracted for the liability
imposed. 28 When the statute so provides but the policy imposes conditions
upon the right of recovery, the court may invoke the rule that a compulsory
statutory bond is to be interpreted so as to conform with the statute, the
provisions of which are deemed to be written into the policy and to overcome
all repugnant provisions thereof.20 Thus a provision in the policy requiring
a judgment against the assured as a condition to an action against the
insurer may be annulled and the liability of the insurer increased to that
defined in the statute.30 Alternatively, the court may find some clause in
the policy such as one providing for payment of a final judgment ir-
respective of the financial responsibility of the assured, and interpret it
as overriding any conditions to recovery against the insurer.
31
As yet there is little authority upon the question whether a defense of
the insurer against the assured, arising from a policy issued under a
statute which does not provide for waiver of defenses, will operate to
defeat the action of an injured party. A court could, if it chose, sustain
the policy defences, since they are not forbidden by the statute32 and
express the intent of the parties. But if the court recognizes the policy
as a compulsory statutory bond and realizes that the purpose of the statute,
protection of the public, cannot be accomplished if the action of the injured
27. Merrill v. Equitable Surety Company of New York, 131 Misc. 541, 227
N. Y. Supp. 266 (Sup. Ct. 1928). The court invoked the rule that in the
absence of the debtor's contrary stipulation the creditor may apply a payment
to any part of the debt he chooses.
28. Gillard v. Manufacturers Insurance Co. of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania;
Devlin v. New York Mutual Casualty Taxicab Insurance Co., both supra note 21.
29. Philip Carey Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 201 Iowa 1063, 206 N. W.
808 (1926); Globe Indemnity Co. v. Barnes, 288 S. W. 121 (Tex. Com. App.
1926).
30. See Curtis v. Michaelson, supra note 21; Milliron v. Dittman, 180 Cal.
443, 181 Pac. 779 (1919) (same result); American Fidelity and Casualty Co.
v. Williams, supra note 21 (using same technique to eliminate policy defenses).
In Piper v. American Fidelity and Casualty Co., 157 S. C. 106, 154 S. E. 106
(1930), joinder was denied because the causes of action were different. In
Clark v. Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Co., 49 R. I. 372, 142 AtI. 614 (1928),
the statute did not provide for joinder.
31. Kruger v. California Highway Indemnity Exchange, supra note 8.
32. An occasional ordinance (Kruger v. California Highway Indemnity
Exchange, supra note 8) or policy (Gillard v. Manufacturers Insurance Co.
of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Devlin v. New York Mutual Casualty Taxicab
Insurance Co.; American Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. Williams, all ipra note
21) provides for recovery regardless of defenses.
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party can be defeated by an act or omission of the assured,83 such defenses
will probably be barred. A requirement that the action of the injured
party be subject to the terms of the policy is found in only one statute. 4
Under the usual statutes, the right of the injured party is subject only to
the limitation that his action be for injuries either "due to the negligence
of the assured" s or "for which the assured is legally liable." 30 Moreover,
since these statutes usually contain a provision requiring in effect the
payment by the insurer of any final judgment against the assured, T
they may easily be construed as imposing liability regardless of conditions
in the policy. 85 That they should be so construed seems clear, for the
purpose of the statutes is not protection of the assured or the insurer, but
protection of the public against the assured and the insurer.
A few cases involve the liability of an insurer for damages caused by
a car owned by the assured but not covered in the policy. If the statute
provides that the policy shall cover all motor vehicles operated by the
assured, and that the insurer shall waive the right of description 80 or
guarantee payment of a final judgment even if the vehicle causing the
damage is not specified in the policy,40 the insurer would doubtless be
liable. The same result would follow the inclusion of such provisions in
the policy by means of a Public Service Commission Rider.41 But if the
statute requires a separate insurance policy or bond for each vehicle
used,42 the task of keeping the assured from operating a vehicle not cov-
ered should be imposed upon the Commission rather than upon an insurer
who under the statute assumes in each policy responsibility for only one
car. A recent case raises the question whether liability can be imposed on
an insurer of a passenger carrier for a car not covered by a policy issued
under a statute requiring that the policy cover "the operations of each
33. Ott v. American Fidelity and Casualty Co., supra note 21; Hipp v.
Prudential Casualty and Surety Co. of St. Louis, Missouri, 244 N. W. 346
(S. D. 1932); see the cases, supra note 20.
34. See the statute of Tennessee, supra note 2.
35. See the statutes of Ark., Fla., I1., Ind., Kan., La., Md., Mo., Nev., N. H.,
N. M., N. C., N. D., Ohio, S. C., Va., Wash., all supra note 2. Crozier v.
Hawkeye Stages, 209 Iowa 313, 228 N. W. 320 (1929).
36. See the statutes of Ala., Conn., Ga., Iowa, Me., Mich., Ore., Mont., Vt.,
all supra note 2.
37. Final judgment clauses are found in the statutes of Ill, Ky., N. D., N. J.,
N. Y., Okla., R. I., S. D., Tenn., Tex., all supra note 2. Clauses creating
liability on the bond either directly to the injured party or through the state
are found in the statutes of Ala., Ark., Fla., Ind., La., Md., Mich., N. M.,
Wash., Wis., all supra note 2. Policies whose terms, controlled by the Com-
missioner, may include such a clause are provided for in most of the statutes.
38. Ott v. American Fidelity and Casualty Co., supra note 21.
39. See the statute of Ark., supra note 2.
40. See the statutes of N. M., and N. C., both supra note 2.
41. Whitlock v. United States Inter-insurance Association, 138 Ore. 383,
6 Pac. (2d) 1088 (1932).
42. See the statutes of Idaho and Utah, both supra note 2.
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vehicle operated" 43 The court held that the statute superseded any
conflicting provisions in the policy, and imposed liability on the insurer
for the operations of the uninsured car.
44 Apparently the court did not
realize that by amendment effective prior to the issue of the policy in
question the statutory requirement that each vehicle be covered no longer
applied to carriers of passengers. 45 The statute did, however, permit the
passenger carrier to file, in lieu of a compulsory bond, insurance "covering
its operations as a .carrier," and such a policy had been issued to the
assured. The court could have as easily interpreted this latter provision
as it actually did interpret the then inapplicable one. In the next few
years similar cases will undoubtedly arise under the usual type of statute,
which makes insurance a condition precedent to the granting of a license
but contains no provision requiring coverage of each vehicle. To hold an
insurer liable for a car not covered in a policy issued under such a statute
would cause the insurer temporary hardship but would further the legis-
lative attempt to protect the public 40 .
THE ARMS EM3ARGO RESOLUTION AND A.MERICAN
NEUTRALITY
A RESOLUTION now before Congress provides that the President may declare
an embargo on the shipment of arms and munitions to any part of the world
in which conditions exist such that their exportation would promote the
employment of force in the course of a dispute between nations.
1 Such
a proposal is representative of many recent recommendations for the modi-
fication of established neutral rights and duties in the trade in arms and
munitions of war,2 and would effect a radical change in American practice
in this field.3 The position which the United States has consistently
43. Such a statute is found in Texas, supra note 2.
44. Hipp v. Prudential Casualty and Insurance Co. of St. Louis, Missouri,
supra note 33.
45. The statute before amendment read: "such insurance shall cover the
operations of each motor vehicle operated by the motor carrier." S. D. Laws
1925, c. 224 § 16. After amendment it read: "In the case of carriers of
property only, such insurance shall cover the operation of each vehicle operated
by the motor carrier." S. D. Laws 1929, c. 180 § 16. The amendment was
effective in March, 1929; the policy was issued and the accident occurred in
December, 1929.
46. Downs v. Georgia Casualty Co., 271 Fed. 310 (D. N. J. 1921), refusez
to go this far.
1. H. R. REP. No. 22, 73d Cong. 1st Sess. on H. J. Res. 93.
2. Burton Resolutions, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., H. J. Res. 1, 171, les. 183;
Fish Resolution, ibid., H. J. Res. 167, 172; also 71st Cong., 1st Sess., H. T.
Res. 1; Capper Resolutions, 70th Cong. 1st Sess., S. J. Res. 14, 70th Cong., 2nd
Sess., S. J. Res. 215; Korell Resolution, 70th Cong., 2nd Sess., H. J. Res. 422;
Porter Resolution, ibid., H. J. Res. 412; 71st Cong., 1st Sess., H. J. Res. 15, 122.
3. The diverse policies expressed in these proposals, supra note 2,-provision
for stricter neutrality by prohibition of all arms exports in time of war, co-
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maintained, 4 that the law of nations imposes no duty upon a neutral to
prevent the exportation from its territory of arms and munitions, derives
support from settled international practice,5 the approval of publicists,
decisions of judicial tribunals 7 and the ratification of the Hague Con-
vention.8 Since neutral trade in contraband is attended with the risk of
confiscation by the belligerent in the event of capture, and usual neutrality
operation with the League by prevention of shipments 'to a violator of the
Pact of Paris, and vesting in the President of power to take either of these
courses at his discretion,-are latent in the instant Resolution and are without
exact precedent in American history. See infra, note 18. Retaliation to a
British Order in Council which interfered unlawfully with neutral trade was
the ground for the embargo laid on March 26, 1794, on all ships and vessels
in the .ports of the United States. Conservation of national resources in con-
templation of war prompted the prohibition of exportation of munitions of
war under an act of May 22, 1794. Napoleon's Berlin decrees, British Decrees
of Blockade, Orders in Council and the attendant illegal interferences with
neutral trade also put in the class of retaliatory measures the embargoes on
all shipping laid by Jefferson, December 18, 1807, and March 1, 1809. The
embargo bills of 1812, and the act of December 17, 1813, were designed as
war measures while the war with Great Britain was in progress; the 1862
and 1898 embargoes obviously fall into the same category. For statutes, cases
and diplomatic correspondence, see 7 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST (1906)
143-147; SEARS, JEFFERSON AND THE EiIBARGO (1927); JENNINGS, THE AMERICAN
EMBARGO 1807-1809 (1921); WOOLSEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW (6th ed. 1891) §
118; TAYLOR, INTERNATIONAL LAW (1901) § 434. Retaliatory embargoes, when
laid with a view to influencing the objectionable interferences with neutral
trade of a foreign state are non-amicable modes of procedure, but the right of
a state to resort to such measures for this purpose appears to be clear. 2 HYDE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1922) 242.
4. The United States while a belligerent has never protested against the
furnishing of war supplies to the enemy, except in the ease of the English
aid accorded the Confederate States in the Civil War, where the claim for
damages was based upon the non-recognition of the belligerency of the South.
Case of the United States in the Geneva Arbitration, 1 M0OOR, HISTORY AND
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (1898) 620.
5. See 4 CALvO, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL (1896) § 2627; BoNFILS, DuOIT
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (1898) 861; Mr. Lansing, Secretary of State, to Mr.
Penfield, Ambassador to Austria-Hungary, August 12, 1915, 2 AMERICAN WuiIT8
BOOK, EUROPEAN WAR 1914. See also Garner, Sale and Exportation of Arms
and Munitions of War to Belligerents (1916) 10 A. J. I. L. 749, 751-758.
6. CALvo, op. cit. supra note 5, § 2625; and see LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, LIST
oF REFERENCES ON EMBARGOES, compiled under direction of H. H. B. Meyer
(1917), for compilations of the views of text-writers.
7. The Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 283 (U. S. 1822); Pearson v. Parson,
108 Fed. 461 (C. C. E. D. La. 1901); The Bermuda, 3 Wall. 514 (U. S. 1865);
see Hamburg-American Steam Packet Co. v. United States, 250 Fed. 747 (C. C. A.
2d, 1918).
8. See Art. VII of Hague Convention of 1907, Concerning the Rights and
Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War; II MALLOY'S TREATIES (1923) 2359;
and Art. VII of the Hague Convention of 1907, Concerning the Rights and Duties
of Neutral Powers and Persons in War on Land, id. at 2298.
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statutes abandon the national to this penalty,0 the trade cannot be said to
be licit in international law; 10 however, in the absence of municipal
prohibition the belligerent is not entitled to neutral governmental aid in
preventing such trade.'1 This practicable solution of the conflicting in-
terest of neutrals in the continuance of normal trade relations and the
belligerent's desire to cripple the resources of the enemy,'- in company
with the entire nexus of ideas surrounding the conception of neutrality,
is repudiated in the program of the new international order promulgated
in the Covenant of the League of Nations. 3 Upon the theory that under
modern conditions any conflict must necessarily involve all nations, 14 peace
9. See the first neutrality proclamation by President Washington, Ama. State
Papers, FOR. REL. I, 140; the neutrality proclamation promulgated in the late
war, 39 STAT. 1760 (1915); and FENwiCK, THE NEUTRALITY LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES (1913) 23.
10. See MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SOME CURRENT ILLUSIONS (1924).
11. Circular of Dep't of State on Neutrality and Contraband of War, Oct. 15,
1914, SEN. Doc. No. 604, 63d Cong., 2d Sess.; see also Mr. Lansing, Secretary of
State, to Mr. Penfield, Ambassador to Austria-Hungary, Aug. 12, 1915, mupra
note 5.
12. See Borchard, Restatement of the Law of Neutrality in Maritime War
(1928) 22 A. J. I. L. 614; Jessup, Birth, Death and Reincarnation of Ncutrality
(1932) 26 A. J. L L. 789; MOORE, op. cit. supra note 10; 2 HYDn, op. cit. cupra
note 3, at 692-708.
13. Axticle 11 of the Covenant provides: "Any war or threat of war whether
immediately affecting any of the members of the League or not is hereby de-
clared a matter of concern to the whole League;" and according to Article 16,
"resort to war by any member in disregard of its covenants shall ipso
facto be deemed . . . an act of war against all other members of the League."
League members are not required to go to war against the covenant breaker
(see Rutgers, Memorandum on Articles 10,11 and 16 (1928) 9 LEAGUE OF NATIONS
PUB. DIsARAMiENT, 3, p. 24) but the Covenant clearly requires unneutral
conduct. Economic support of the nation denominated the victim and economic
boycott of the "aggressor" are not the impartiality required of neutrals by
international law and by Articles VII and IX of the Hague Convention of
1907.
14. The promulgators of this view are ambiguous as to whether this is
inevitable and whether it is desirable. The former position would seem to be
based upon the untenable assumption that all wars will be fought on the scale
of the last. The premise of the latter is that the cause of ultimate peace will
be promoted by the threat that any nation which disturbs the international
status quo must on principle face a united and hostile world. Lac: of con-
fidence in the efficacy of sanctions as a means of producing peace goes to
the essence of the League system in its present form. For views favorable
to sanctions see Chamberlain, Enforcing Economic Sanctions (1926) INTM-
NATIONAL CONCILIATION 41, and The Embargo Rcsolut ions and Neutrality (1920),
ibid. at 257; Capper, Mak+ng the Peacc Pact Effective (1929) ANN. Am. AcAD.
40; Hindmarsh, Self-Help in Time of Peace (1932) 26 A. J. I. L. 315; Whitton,
What Follows the Pact of Paris (1932) INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION 7; Wright,
Changes in the Conception of War (1924) 18 A. J. I. L. 755, and The Future of
Neutrality (1928) INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION 353; SHoTwELL, WAR As An
19331 COMMENTS 1111
is to be enforced through economic pressure upon a State which resorts to
war in settlement of disputes; 15 an embargo on arms and munitions heads
the list of sanctions to be applied.16 The resolution now before Congress,
predicated upon these same premises, would permit the President to bar
shipments of arms to one belligerent while allowing them to another. It
is in form an extension to international wars of the Resolutions of 1912
and 1922 providing for an embargo on arms and munitions to countries
engaged in domestic conflicts.Y7 The earlier resolutions were interpreted
by the administration to allow a discriminatory embargo against the revo-
lutionaries. s Similarly, the present resolution will permit intervention 10
INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY (1929) c. XX. For the contrary view see
MOORE, op. cit. supra note 10; Borchard, "War" and "Peace" (1933) 27 A. J. I. L.
114; Hyde and Wehle, The Boycott in Foreign Affairs, ibid. at 1.
15. Article 16 provides for severance of commercial and personal intercourse
with residents of the covenant breaker, use of military, naval and air forces
by all the members to enforce the agreement, and for financial and economic
measures of mutual support among the member states in resisting counter-
measures by the violator of the Covenant.
16. See Jessup, American Neutrality and International Police (1928) WORLD
PEACE FOUNDATION PAMPHLETS 355.
17. 37 STAT. 630 (1912).
18. The embargoes on arms shipments laid under these statutes constitute
a unique and anomolous chapter in the foreign policy of the United States, and
cannot be regarded as precedents for the application of an embargo on one or
both belligerents in an international war. The measures were designed pri-
marily to lessen the continuous revolutionary disturbances around the Carribean
and in Mexico. With this intention, President Taft forbade arms shipments
to Mexico (Proclamation of President Taft, March 14, 1912, 37 STAT. 1733
(1912)). President Wilson withdrew the embargo when it was discovered that
it hampered Carranza in buying arms in the United States while Huerta
drew supplies from Europe. 38 STAT. 1992 (1914). Secretary Hughes openly
permitted the sale of arms to the Mexican government while enforcing the
embargo against the revolutionaries (43 STAT. 1934 (1924); HYDE, AMERICAN
SECRETARES OF STATE (1929) 308) and President Coolidge used his power under
the Resolution to permit one of the parties to the struggle in Nicaragua to pro-
cure munitions in the United States while the insurgents were refused the same
right (44 STAT. 2625 (1926), Message to Congress on Nicaragua Situation,
January 10, 1927, N. Y. Times, January 11, 1927). The same procedure was
followed in 1930 when, shortly before the success of the revolutionary forces,
President Hoover at the request of the Brazilian Ambassador placed an embargo
on the exportation of arms and munitions shipments to Brazilian insurgents.
46 STAT. 3036 (1930). The reluctance of the Executive originally to make
explicit the fact that the embargoes were applied to only one party to the
conflict is indicative of a recognition of the irregularity of the practice. STOWELL,
INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1921) 354; see FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL
LAw (1924) 161.
19. Under limiting conditions, discriminatory application of an embargo
under the Resolution of 1912 and 1922 may be legally unobjectionable. "The
duration of an anarchical condition, coupled with the apparent improbability of
order ever being restored, may justify interference on the ground of the interest
which all states are presumed to have in the stability and integrity of each
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or breach of neutrality by the application of a discriminatory embargo by
the United States against a nation designated the aggressor, in concert
-with the sanction-applying members of the League.20
The current practice of nations suggests, however, that such an overt
compromise of neutral status by the United States, itself a stranger to
the Covenant, would indicate more confidence in the proposition that all
future wars will be world wars than is felt by the signatories.2 ' No
member of the League has repealed its neutrality laws; 2 since 1919
neutrality has been stipulated in many treaties entered into by European
Powers; 23 military alliances recently concluded imply that the contractors
recognize the possibility of war in the traditional mode; 2-1 proposed conven-
state." Amos, quoted in STOwELL, op. cit. supra note 18, at 355. While this
principle, fortified by a showing of injury owing to the continuous disturbances
at our borders (Wright, Territorial Propinquity (1918) 12 A. J. I. L. 533) and
the Monroe Doctrine, (see HART, MONROE DOCTRINE (1916) C. 20) may be put
into service to validate the action of the United States in Mexico and Nicaragua
(see also Stowell, Doctrine of Constitutional Lcgitimacy (1931) 25 A. J. I. L.
302), it would afford no protection against a claim for damages based on an
illegal interference in the conflict of two foreign and distant states, even though
-war between them had not been declared. For the attempt by some sponsors
of the League to justify the intervention involved in application of sanctions
and to avoid the duties of neutrality by denying the existence of qegal" war,
see Maccoby, Reprisals as a Measure of Redress Short of War (1924) CALI. J.
70; McNair, The Legal Meaning of War and the Relation of War to Reprisals
(1925) TRANs. op GRor. Soc. 45; Wright, Whwn Does War Exist? (1932) 26
A. J. I. L. 362; Wilson, Use of Force and War (1932) ibid. at 327. For
criticism of this view see Borchard, "War" and "Peace," supra note 14.
20. The principal impetus behind the proposed Resolution and its fore-
runners is the issue emphasized by the International Blockade Committee:
"So long as great exporting countries remain outside the League, the appli-
cation of Article 16 in its entirety would ... meet with great obstacles
," consequently efforts should be made in case the sanctions are applied
"to arrive at arrangements which will at least insure their passive cooperation."
Report of International Blockade Convention, Aug. 28, 1921, 5 LEAGUE OF
NATIONS PUB., LEGAL 1927, 14, 16, 21.
21. The fact that the Covenant has not abolished neutrality even for
Member states is recognized in the various studies prepared for the League.
Secretary-General's Report on Article 16, May 16, 1927, 5 LEAGUE OF NATIONS
PUB. LEGAL 1927, 14, at 83; Rutgers, Memoranduln on Articles 10, 11, and 16,
supra note 13.
22. Letter of John Bassett Moore, read at the Hearings before the Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs, House of Rep., 73rd Cong., 1st Sess., on H. J. Res. 93.
23. See treaty between Germany and Soviet Russia, 53 LEAGUE OF NATIONS,
Treaty Series (1926) 387; see also text of notes in Sixth Ycarbook of the
League of Nations, 11 WORLD PEAcE FOUNDATION PAwPHLETS 145 ff; Austrian-
Czechoslovak treaty, 9 LEAGUE OF NATIONs, Treaty Series (1922) 248; treaty
between Italy and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, 24 LEAGUE
oF NATIONS, Treaty Series (1924) 32; Convention between the Soviet Union
and Lithuania signed September 28, 1926, 60 ibid, at 154.
24. See the Locarno Treaty signed between Germany, Belgium, France,
Great Britain and Italy. 54 LEAGUE OF NATIONS, Treaty Series (1926-27) 289.
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tions governing the rules of radio and aircraft provide for the legal incidents
of non-participation; 25 neutrality has been recognized by the Permanent
Court of International Justice; 2G and in wars fought between League
members in the last decade the conduct of their non-belligerent co-con-
tractors has indicated a scrupulous regard for the traditional duties of the
neutral.27 It would seem therefore that the laws of neutrality are founded
too firmly on irreducible facts of international relations to be exorcised
by a manifesto; 28 self interest, based upon political and economic con-
siderations, and not the abstract justice or injustice of a given cause,
determines whether a government allows itself to be drawn into a war
in which it initially has no concern. The failure of the League to function
in recent conflicts according to its more publicized tenets 20 may also be
referred to ambiguities and lacunae in the Covenant itself. Since Article
16 may be invoked only where Article 12 has not been fulfilled, neutrality
would appear to be the status of League members where the dispute has
been submitted to arbitration and belligerency has been postponed for
three months.30 "Legal" war and, correlatively, old-style neutrality may
presumably still occur because of the right of self-enforcement of awards
given by Articles 13 and 15. 31 Absolute individual discretion in joining
25. See MOORE, op. cit. supra note 10, at 182.
26. "Wimbledon," P. C. I. J. ser. A, no. 1 (1923).
27. It is significant in this connection that the one action taken by a League
Member in the Sino-Japanese conflict now in progress was an embargo on the
shipment of arms and munitions to both belligerents, despite the unanimous
verdict of the Council of the previous day that Japan was at fault. See Sir
John Simon in House of Commons, London Times, Feb. 28, 1933, p. 7; Borchard,
Book Review (1933) 33 COL. L. REv. 552. Cf. action of Great Britain in the
Greco-Turkish War, mentioned in Letter of John Bassett Moore, read at Hear-
ings, supra note 22.
28. See note 12, supra.
29. Discussion of Italian Occupation of Corfu in League of Nations Counoil,
Sept. 1924, 4 LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFFICIAL JOURNAL 1277-1278; Wright, Opinion
of Commission of Jurists on the Janina-Corfu Affair (1924) 18 A. J. 1. L.
536; Woolsey, The Bolivia-Paraguay Dispute (1930) 24 A. J. I. L. 122.
30. In Article 12 the Members agree that if there should arise between them
any dispute likely to lead to a rupture they will submit the matter to arbitration
and will not resort to war until three months after the award.
31. In Article 13 the Members agree that they will carry out in full good
faith any award or decision that may be rendered and that they will not resort
to war against a Member of the League which complies therewith; in Article
15 it is stipulated that if there should arise between Members of the League
any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration,
the Members of the League will submit the matter to the Council. If the
Council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to by the Members
thereof, other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the
dispute, the Members of the League reserve to themselves the right to take
such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and
justice. See Hindmarsh, supra note 14.
in the application of sanctions having been retained by each nation, -
those who decline to do so apparently maintain neutrality. M2oreover the
legal right of non-members to all the ordinary incidents of non-partici-
pation has been officially recognized by the League,23 and it is conceded
that the system of international police cannot operate effectively without
complete coordination of the economic field.34 Finally, the extreme im-
probability that under the terms of the Covenant unanimity will be
.obtained in the determination of the "aggressor" in a given war,35 alone
removes from the realm of practical considerations the possibility that
the laws of neutrality need no longer be reckoned with in international
affairs. 36
The imposition of an embargo upon a single belligerent in accordance
-with the proposed resolution would not only indicate a willingness to go
further in applying sanctions than League members themselves, but would
leave the United States in a peculiarly vulnerable position. For while the
common agreement providing for discrimination against a Covenant-
breaking belligerent may alter as among the signatbries the obligations
-which international law imposes upon neutral countries, the United States
32. The Council has no authority to render a binding decision as to whether
a breach of the Covenant has taken place. It merely renders an opinion and
each member decides for itself whether it is in agreement. This arrangement
has become so firmly entrenched that it has been applied to other articles of
the Covenant, such as Article 10, and has reappeared in the Pact of Paris.
See Assembly Resolution of 1926, REC. OF THE 14TH ASSEBMBLY, 453, 739-740;
Giraud, Memorandum on Pacific Blockade, May 17, 1927, 5 LEAGUE oF NATIONS,
PUB. LEGAL (1927) 14, p. 89.
33. Article 16 is based upon a theory of "pacific blockade." Rutgers, supra
note 21. Thus in any conflict in which the League is involved, if action under
Article 16 is confined to the application of economic measures which do not
involve a state of war, the extensive rights of peace-time trade obtain. The
position of the United States that pacific blockade is a belligerent right only,
as well as the right of non-members to the usual privileges of neutrals, is
conceded. Giraud, supra note 32.
34. Obviously whether the rules of peace or war obtain, States entering
upon a policy of economic coercion would be throwing a boomerang if the result
-were only to close to themselves markets still open to competitors. This was
illustrated in the effect of the blacklists during the World War (see Jessup,
supra note 16), and has been the subject of considerable discussion in League
Committees. See Canadian Resolution on Article 10, 14th ASSrEBLy, Sept.
24-25, 1923, supra note 32.
35. The attempt of the Geneva Protocol to introduce a definition of an
aggressor nation which would curtail the discretion of the member states in
judging whether their obligations have come into existence, leaving the function
exclusively to the Council, proved abortive. Records of the Fifth Asscmbly,
Minutes of Meetings of the First Committee, OFFICIAL JOURNAL, SPEC. SuPr.
No. 24, 11 WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION PAMPHLETS; BA=, THE GENEVA PaO-
-TOCOL (1925) 169.
36. Borchard, Remarks (1929) PRoc. AM. SOC. OF INT. LAw 104; (1930)
ibid. 102; (1931) ibid. 173. Contra: Wright, The Outlawrj of War (1924)
19 A. J. I. L. 76.
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is not a party to any similar treaty for the breach of which economic
sanctions are contemplated37 General agreements to eschew violence i1s
an instrument of national policy such as the Pact of Paris, which do not
expressly purport to modify the law, do not permit deviation from neutral
duties which become operative upon the outbreak of war; -18 and in laying
a discriminatory embargo the United States would have no defence against
a claim for breach of neutrality or unprivileged intervention.30
Reliance upon sanctions rests upon the assumption that the established
system of neutral rights and duties is ineffective in producing or main-
taining peace in international society.45 The practical operation of the
law of arms and munitions traffic in time of war gives considerable
support to this indictment. Although the right of the neutral to sell
military supplies to both sides has never been seriously challenged in
principle, the abundance of diplomatic protest on the subject is indicative
of the friction which the traffic produces. 41 The experience of the United
States in the late war illustrates the fact that though the neutral may
scrupulously observe legal .impartiality, its resources are frequently of
dubious value to some of the States to which they are theoretically avail-
able.4 Where, upon the outbreak of war, no restrictions are placed upon
the trade, the neutral may become an arsenal for the belligerent which
37. The Briand-Kellogg Pact contains no provision for protection of states
which attempt to penalize the treaty-breaking nation, 46 STAT. 2343 (1028);
nor does the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922, 44 STAT. 2113 (1922); nor the Five
Power Treaty of 1921, 43 STAT. 1655 (1922). See Jessup, The United States
and Treaties For the Avoidance of War (1928) INTERNATIONAL CONOILIATION 179.
38. The legal significance of the Pact of Paris has been the subject of
considerable controversy. For thd view that it justifies discriminatory action
see Chamberlain, Remarks (1930) PRoc. Am. Soc. INT. LAw 127; Kingsbury,
Remarks (1929) ibid. at 103; SHOTWELL, WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT op NATIONAL
PoLicY (1929) 214; Wright, Neutrality and Neutral Rights Followittg the
Pact of Paris (1930) PROc. Am. Soc. INT. LAw 78, and The Meaning of the
Pact of Paris (1933) 27 A. J. I. L. 39. For the contrary view, see Borchard,
The Multilateral Treaty for the Renunciation of War (1929) 23 A. J. I. L.
116; and Hyde, An American Substitute for British Blockades (1929) 7 Pon.
AFF. 632.
39. Only a convention implementing the Pact, comparable to those signed
at the Second Hague Conference of 1907, would relieve the United States of
its duties as a neutral or give it the right to interfere in an "imperfect war"
between two combatants. Hyde and Wehle, The Boycott in Foreign Affairs
(1933) 21 A. J. I. L. 1.
40. See note 14, supra.
41. See MOORE, op. cit. supra note 3, at 955-969; Mr. Bryan, Secretary of
State, to Senator Stone, Jan. 20, 1915, AmERICAN WUITE Boox, EUROPEAN
WAR, II, 58, 60; Mr. Lansing, Secretary of State, to Mr. Penfield, Ambassador
to Austria-Hungary, Aug. 12, 1915, ibid. at 194.
42. See Mr. Lansing, Secretary of State, to Mr. Penfield, Ambassador to
Austria-Hungary, August 12, 1915, supra note 5, for an account of a closely
analogous situation in regard to the sale of arms to England by Germany
during the Boer War.
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has access to its markets 43 and a military obstacle to the nation which
by the fortune of war has been cut off from the sea. Absence of legal
duty on the part of the neutral to place an embargo upon the shipment of
arms and munitions in this event would be unlikely to deter the blockaded
belligerent from choosing to risk making an open enemy of the neutral
if the continued traffic in supplies threatened to weight the scales against
its success. The artificiality under modern conditions of the distinctions
between a shipment of arms by the government,44 private exportation as a
purely commercial venture, and a sale involving the use of territory as a
base of operations, 4 ; also indicates the failure of the rules of neutralit, to
insulate the neutral from the military operations of the belligerents.40
Private exportation of arms to a belligerent, which is legal, may be as
direct a form of assistance as the illegal use by it of neutral territory as
a base of supply for an army or a battleship. 47 Where attention is focussed
on the direct and practical effect of supplies from neutral territory upon
the belligerent receiving them, as well as upon its particular agency,4 s it
is comprehensible that a government which can control the trade may be
held accountable for what occurs when it fails to effect a restriction which
will make the facts conform to the principle of neutral impartiality and
aloofness from the conflict.
Amendment of the laws, however, rather than unguarded breach of
neutral duty would be better calculated to promote the end desired. To
43. Both Germany and Austria-Hungary in 1915 emphasized the extensive
new industries which had been built up to feed the trade in arms and munitions
between the United States and Great Britain and its allies. See Memorandum
from the Gerina Embassy, April 4, 1915, AmucAN WHTE Boou, EuROPEAN
WAR I, 73; WmLImIs, THE UNWTED STATES AND DIsmAm.iEN (1931) c. 7.
44. Acording to Article VI of the Hague Convention of 1907, concerning
the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War: "The supply in any
manner, directly or indirectly, by a neutral power to a belligerent power, of
warships, ammunition, or war material of any kind whatever, is forbidden."
II M .4.Loy's TREATIES (1923) 2359; Hyde, op. cit. supra note 3, at 697.
45. "The ports or waters of the neutral are not to be made the base of naval
operations by a belligerent." Case of the United States in the Genera Arbitration,
supra; note 4.
46. Sanction was given rules preventing neutral duties from becoming an
obstacle to the fulfillment of needs of belligerent fleets, in the Second Hague Peace
Conference of 1907 (supra note 8), with the result that neutrals were encouraged
to allow transactions tending to turn their ports into bases of belligerent
operations.
47. See Curtis, The Law of Hostile Military Expeditions as Applied by the
United States (1914) 8 A. J. I. L. 1; FENwIcx, op. cit. supra note 9, at 147.
48. Since neutral territory is not held to be a base when the assistance
given the belligerent does not affect a particular unit of its military, the
quantity of arms and munitions which a belligerent obtains for general use
from the neutral implies nothing as to its duty to restrict the trade. Mr.
Bryan, Secretary of State, to Count von Bernstorff, German Ambassador at
Washington, Dec. 24, 1914, A~nsucAN WHWn Boox, EUnoPEAN WAn, II, 31.
But see BLUNTSCHLI, Daorr INTERNATIONAL CoDIFiL (Ed. by Lardy, 1886) 766.
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insist that the neutral undertake to guarantee equal aid to both belliger-
ents 49 would be to impose a duty impossible of accomplishment; 60 but a
resolution providing for an embargo on the shipment of arms and munitions
to both belligerents upon the outbreak of war 61 would effect necessary
modifications of the present laws of neutrality without encountering
practical or legal difficulties, 52 or embroiling the United States in foreign
49. The German government during'the late war requested an equalization
of advantages as between the Allies and the Central Powers. See Memorandum
from the German Embassy at Washington, July 16, 1915, supra note 43, at 66.
50. This would involve the impossible task of a relative weighing of the
needs of each belligerent. See reply of Mr. Lansing, Secretary of State, to Mr.
Penfield, August 12, 1915, supra note 5.
51. Professors Moore and Borchard suggested such a modification of the
Resolution now before Congress. Hearings, supra note 22.
52. In United States v. Chavez, 228 U. S. 525 (1913), the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the Resolution of 1912. In view of the radical
differences in the purposes and effects of that measure (supra note 18) this
precedent cannot be accorded much weight in judging the constitutionality of
the instant Resolution. It has been pointed out by eminent authority that
the proposed Act would amount to an abdication of the Senate's treaty-making
power and would infringe upon the war-making powers of Congress. Professors
Moore and Borchard at Hearings, supra note 22. It is doubtful, however, that
the Resolution, if passed, would be declared unconstitutional. Congress is the
only authority in the United States that can declare war (U. S. Const. Art.
I, § 8, el. 2) and it cannot delegate this power. CORWIN, PRESIDENT'S CONTROL
oF FOREIN RELATIONS (1917) 153. But Congress has never yet declared war;
it has only recognized war as having been begun by the enemy. WRiauT, TuE
CONTROL OF Am ERIcAN FOREIGN RELATIONS (1922) 288. The distinction be-
tween constitutional power and ability to effect certain results (PomnoY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (1886) 65) may be pressed into service to rationalize
the fact that the President already has powers which in their exercise may
lead to war. Tansill, The War Powers of the President of the United States
with Special Reference to the Beginning of Hostilities (1930) 45 POL. Sal. Q.
1. Two-thirds of the Senate must assent to any treaty entered into by the
Executive (U. S. Const. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2) and the principle that legislative
power cannot be delegated has always been assumed to be applicable to the
treaty power. SEN. FOR. REL. COM., Rep. 62d. Cong., 1st Sess., SEN. Doo. 98, 6.
But power to make agreements in pursuance of enacted policy is not "legislative
power," and Congress may authorize the President to decide when the conditions
exist which are to bring its policy into operation and the method by which
such a policy is to be administered. Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1892).
Under this doctrine extensive extra-constitutional powers have been given a
clean bill of health by the Supreme Court. See Wickersham, Delegation of
Power to Legislate (1925) 11 Va. L. Rev. 183; Cheadle, Delegation of Legislative
Functions (1918) 27 YALE L. J. 892; Welch, The Flexible Provisions in the
Tariff Act (1927) 13 VA. L. REv. 206. No Act of Congress has ever been
declared unconstitutional because it is a delegation of legislative power, Comment
(1931) 18 VA. L. REv. 424; nor has any treaty ever been declared unconstitutional.
CORWIN, NATIONAL SUPREMACY (1913) 85. The Court would be the more
reluctant to review action under the instant Resolution, in view of the fact
that it would involve strongly political questions. WRIGHT, supra at 82. The
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conflicts. 53 The fact that several countries have successfully enforced
embargoes on arms and munitions 5 4 demonstrates that such measures
may be applied without excessive surveillance and delay of innocent trade.
Furthermore, a neutral is under no obligation in international law to
permit the traffic in contraband.m5 Such a restriction if made is a purely
municipal regulation; foreign nations have no right to insist upon its
observance and occasional failures to make the prohibition effective would
lay no foundation for international claims. It has been suggested that
such a concession to belligerent interests would in principle undermine
completely neutral right to trade in any commodity, since no absolute line
of distinction can be drawn between munitions and other articles which,
though not directly used in military operations, are essential in carrying on
war.5 6 The speciousness of this objection is obvious when its similarity to
the Allied contention that no distinction can be drawn between conditionally
contraband and absolute contraband is observed.57  Moreover, an embargo
may legally be imposed in the interest of safeguarding neutrality even
during the course of a war, despite the fact that only the belligerent which
proposed grant of power to the President is already possessed by the Executive
Departments of the chief arms-exporting nations of the world: Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Spain, The Nether-
lands, and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. Memorandum by Mr. J. C.
Green, Dep't of State, House Com. on Foreign Affairs, Feb. 14, 1933.
53. Application of sanctions with the League under the instant Resolution
would be tantamount to accepting membership, a course which still appears to
be in conflict with public opinion. Borchard, Letter to N. Y. Herald Tribune,
March 14, 1933.
54. During the Franco-German War of 1870, Belgium, Switzerland, Austria-
Hungary, Denmark, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, and Japan forbade the
exportation of arms and munitions to both belligerents. BLU1'ESCHLI, op. cit.
supra note 48, § 766. At the outbreak of the Spanish American War, a few
states prohibited the export of arms and munitions from their territories. See
Circular of Brazilian Government of April 29, 1898; Proclamation of the King
of Denmark of April 29, 1898; Decree of Governor of Curacao; and neutrality
decree of Portugal of April 29, 1898, all in PROCLAmATIONS AND DECnEZ3
DURING THE WAR WITH SPAIN. During the past war, Denmark, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, and the Netherlands, put embargoes on arms and
munitions. Mloore, The Meaning of Neutrality (1915) ANN. AM. AcAD. 145.
Brazil has stringent rules of neutrality governing trade in contraband, Article
IV of which "absolutely forbids the exportation of arms and munitions of
war from Brazil to any belligerent." Da Gama, The Neutrality Rules Adopted
By Brazil, ibid. 147.
55. Statement of American delegate to the Second Hague Convention, quoted
in Jessup, supra note 16 at 52.
56. Earl Granville to Count Bernstorff, Ambassador to England: "In the
American Civil War no cargoes would have been more useful to the Southern
states than cloth, leather, and quinine. It would be difficult for a neutral and
obviously impossible for a belligerent to draw the line. . . . 1 61 BiT. AND
FoR. STATE PAPERs 765.
57. See MooRE, op. cit. supra note 10, for a thorough demolition of this
argument.
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has benefited from and come to depend upon an open market is deprived of
supplies from this source; 5 however, the issue of partiality would not
arise under the resolution here proposed since the restriction would date
from the beginning of the conflict. If the measure were introduced in
the form of an amendment to the neutrality laws this legal position would
be indisputable.
The most persistent opposition to prohibition of munitions shipments to
belligerents is based on the toleration of 59 and dependence upon 00 private
manufacture of arms. Insistence of small States that inability to buy
from neutrals in the event of belligerency will expose them to attack by
better prepared nations,61 the prediction that such restriction upon neutral
trade will encourage militarism in the form of storage of arms and
maintenance of munitions factories by States which had none before,02" and
the argument that any measure which tends to impair the size and efficiency
of the industry will deplete the military resources of the United States 03
58. During the late war much was made of the argument that the im-
position of an embargo in the course of the conflict would amount to taking
sides, since only the Allies would be deprived of an advantage. Mr. Bryan to
German Ambassador, April 4, 1915, supra note 48.
59. Salter, Control of the Arms Traffic, N. Y. Times, April 2, 1933: ".
the business of arms manufacture is a powerful vested interest in all the
'producing' countries, the more powerful because it is closely associated with
the heavy industries generally which supply non-military needs; and, like
every big vested interest which depends largely for its profits on government
policy, it exercises an influence in the formation of that policy." For an account
of the private traffic see White, Traffic in Arms (1928) LEAGUE OF NATIONS
UNION; LEHMiAN-RUSSBULT, WAR FOR PROFITS (1930); BAe, DISARMAMENT
(1926) c. 16; Carnegie, Private Manufacture of Arms (1931) 10 INT. Arr.
504. Under the League of Nations a movement for the regulation of the
traffic has been begun. But see § 33 of the Geneva Convention of 1925 on
arms trade in Proceedings of the Conference for the Supervision of the Inter-
national Trade in Arms (1925) 237, 599, 749; and the draft Convention on
Private Manufacture of Arms, LEAGUE OF NATIONS, OFFICIAL JOURNAL (1928)
(9th year) 1587. See Woolsey, Convention for the Supervision of Trado in
Arms and Munitions (1926) 20 A. J. I. L. 151.
60. See Mr. Lansing, Secretary of State to Mr. Penfield, Ambassador to
Austria-Hungary, August 12, 1915, supra note 5. During the late war all but
10% of the munitions used by the United States were furnished by private
firms. Exportation of Arms, Munitions, or Implements of War to Belligerent
Nations, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, H. REP. 70th
Cong., 1st Sess., on H. J. Res. 183.
61. See Memorandum of the Finnish Delegation in LEAGUE or NATIONS,
REPORTS AND RESOLUTIONS ON ARTICLE 16, 56, stressing the position of small
States having no raw materials for the production of war supplies and no
industrial capacity for manufacturing war materials. See also Conference on
Traffic in Arms, LEAGUE OF NATIONS, A. B., 1925, IX.
62. See Dennis, The Right of Citizens of Neutral Countries to Sell and
Export Arms and Munitions of War to Belligerents (1915) 40 ANN. Am. AcAD.
168; WESTLAKE, COLLECTED PAPERS (1914) 362.
63. Hearings, supra note 60.
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in the event of its belligerency, have put an effective quietus on proposals
tending to reduce the volume of the munitions business. But the solicitude
for the welfare of small States which keeps munitions markets open would
appear to be of dubious value to them. Defeat by better prepared States
and failure to develop munitions industries may be traced to economic
limitations rather than to their reliance upon neutral markets.64 The
rapid obsolescence of military supplies 05 alone would discourage extensive
peace-time storage. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the majority
of the wars in the last few decades have been fought between small coun-
tries 66 and though it is undeniable that in theory a durable peace is pre-
ferable to temporary cessation of the conflict owing to inability to secure
arms,67 the fact that minor irritations provoke resort to force where arms
are easily available, and the notorious record of arms manufacturers in
independently fostering hostilities by easy terms,68 suggest that the
prospect of an embargo may bring to arbitration disputes now settled by
war. Nor does the government profit from its toleration of the private
traffic. Since the type of equipment employed in foreign armies differs
from that of the United States, the machinery used to make arms and
munitions during our neutrality must undergo extensive readaptation
before quantity production for American armament can beginG3
The resolution now before Congress would sanction acts involving breach
of neutrality, and by inflaming public opinion would tend to draw us into
war. An embargo on arms shipments to both belligerents, on the other
hand, would place additional safeguards on our neutral status. That such
an embargo, by resulting in impairment of the size and profit of the private
munitions business, might lead to nationalization of that industry, would
provide an added inducement to the enactment of the resolution in this
modified form.70
64. Chamberlain, The Embargo Resolutions and Neutrality, supra note 14.
65. Testimony of Assistant Secretary of War, Hearings, supra note 60.
66. Salter, supra note 59.
67. von Bar, Observations sur la contrabando do guerro (1894) 26 Ruv.
Dnorr INTERNATIONAL, 1 series, 401.
68. See Salter, supra note 59.
69. See Hearings, supra note 60.
70. The proposed restriction would remove the possibility that a European
convention limiting armaments might be rendered abortive by purchases from
the neutral United States of arms which a contracting party had agreed not
to manufacture or acquire when at peace. Shotwell, An American Policy uit&
Reference to Disarmament (1926) INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION 255.
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